American Renaissance model basket

Freight, Rail & Shipping

Duopoly rails and quality logistics at mid-cycle economics and sensible multiples.

What is the thesis for Freight, Rail & Shipping?

A concentrated book of North American freight rails, less-than-truckload operators, intermodal providers, and brokers. We are buying network-economics businesses at mid-cycle or modestly below-mid-cycle earnings, with the top two positions in the Eastern duopoly rails and the third in the highest-quality less-than-truckload franchise.

This is a curated QuantLink model basket. It is not a filed portfolio, not a fund, and not investment advice.

Published Apr 14, 2026. Updated Apr 14, 2026. Source: QuantLink curated model basket and FastAPI ideas endpoint.

Holdings
12
Benchmark
SPY
Status
New
1Y model return
+26.7%

Performance as of Nov 22, 2026.

Thesis narrative

The question

Are North American freight rails and quality less-than-truckload franchises priced for a normal volume recovery, or for a permanent compression in the pricing power that network economics have historically conferred?

Base rates

The reference class is North American freight cycles since Staggers deregulation in 1980: a sequence of five completed volume cycles in which rail operating ratios have declined from the low 70s to the high 50s, and the duopoly Eastern rails have compounded earnings per share at 9-13% annually through full cycles. The base rate for the rails to beat the S&P across a three-year window anchored at below-mid-cycle volume is roughly the 60th-70th percentile. In less-than-truckload, the base rate is more concentrated: the top-tier operator has compounded at roughly the 80th percentile of industrials across completed cycles, driven by terminal-network density that new entrants cannot replicate.

The imputed probability embedded in current consensus forward numbers is that pricing compresses one to two hundred basis points as volume normalizes. That is a reasonable prior under simple capacity-utilization logic. It is likely incorrect for network-oligopoly industries where pricing discipline has historically held through volume troughs and expanded through recoveries.

Why the consensus view is wrong (or incomplete)

The sell-side models freight as a cyclical price-volume trade-off: weak volume compresses pricing, strong volume expands it. The causal mechanism that framework misses is that rail and top-tier less-than-truckload pricing is not set by spot-market capacity utilization. It is set by contract renewals that key off long-run service quality, fuel-adjusted rate escalators, and intermodal conversion economics. Those contracts renew on 12-36 month cycles and reflect inflation pass-through and service premium, not spot capacity.

The second missed mechanism is the onshoring freight-mix shift. Reshored industrial production generates more short-haul and medium-haul freight per unit of GDP than offshored production does, because the final-mile component is domestic rather than port-landed. That structurally favors less-than-truckload and short-haul intermodal over long-haul truckload and over port-origin supply chains. The mix shift is early, but the disclosures from the top less-than-truckload operator are consistent with it.

The market is pricing spot dynamics. The real variable is contract structure and freight mix. That asymmetry is the inefficiency.

Position construction

The book organizes into three sub-books.

The first is Eastern-duopoly rails, with CSX at 20% and NSC at 20%. These are the network toll-takers; pricing is governed by contract, service quality is measurable, and the historical operating-ratio floor has moved lower with each cycle. They anchor the book because the base rate of outperformance at below-mid-cycle volumes is the strongest in the cohort.

The second sub-book is quality less-than-truckload and intermodal, anchored by ODFL at 16% -- the terminal-network quality franchise with the highest operating-ratio ceiling in the group. JBHT (~9%) and XPO (~8.4%) add intermodal and less-than-truckload breadth; CHRW (~8.3%) captures brokered-freight optionality as spot-rate normalization flows through. EXPD (~9%) is a capital-light international forwarder that provides mix diversification away from pure North American surface freight. GXO (~3.5%) is a contract-logistics position sized for its more volatile margin profile.

The third sub-book is marine and specialty: KEX (~2.6%) captures inland-barge exposure to petrochemical and agricultural flows, MATX (~1.7%) captures trans-Pacific containerized freight with a Jones Act moat, and GBX (~0.8%) is a rail-car manufacturer sized to reflect its cyclicality. ARCB (~1%) is a smaller less-than-truckload position held for its below-cohort multiple and recovery leverage.

The top three positions concentrate the book in the franchises where network economics provide the clearest margin of safety.

Asymmetric payoff

If volumes normalize to mid-cycle by the end of 2027 and pricing holds or expands modestly, the weighted book returns roughly 15-25% per year, with dividend and buyback support providing a floor. If volumes remain below trend and multiples compress one turn, the book returns roughly -5 to -12%, cushioned by the capital-return profile at the rails and top less-than-truckload operator. If freight-mix shifts accelerate and pricing expands 150-250 basis points above consensus, the right tail is 30-45% with a re-rating toward quality-compounder multiples at the anchor holdings.

Assigning a 55% probability to the base case, a 25% probability to the bear case, and a 20% probability to the bull case, expected value is roughly +12 to +18% annualized against an SPY base rate near +8%. The payoff is asymmetric because the downside is bounded by dividends, buybacks, and operating-ratio floor economics, while the upside compounds on contract pricing that does not require a volume forecast to be right.

Three things that would change our mind

  1. Eastern-rail operating ratios rising by more than 200 basis points for two consecutive quarters without a corresponding pricing response, which would indicate pricing discipline has broken.
  2. ODFL's tonnage-weighted yield declining on a year-over-year basis for two consecutive quarters, signaling that less-than-truckload pricing has lost independence from spot-market dynamics.
  3. Sustained intermodal share loss to long-haul truckload at disclosed rates exceeding 300 basis points annually, which would undercut the freight-mix-shift component of the thesis.

What we are explicitly NOT betting on

We are not buying long-haul truckload carriers, which lack network-oligopoly economics and have historically been the most exposed segment in pricing troughs. We are not buying parcel operators or last-mile platforms; those businesses have different cost structures and different customer dynamics that belong in a separate portfolio. And we are not betting on a near-term volume surge; the thesis holds across a range of volume paths because the base rate of outperformance for network-economics franchises is positive even at below-mid-cycle volumes. The margin of safety comes from network structure, not from a volume forecast.

Model basket holdings

Model basket: curated equal or target weighting, not a filed portfolio. Weights are the target basket weights returned by the live ideas endpoint.

NameSymbolModel weight
CSX CorporationCSX20.00%
XPO Logistics, Inc.XPO8.44%
Norfolk Southern CorporationNSC20.00%
C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc.CHRW8.30%
Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc.ODFL16.01%
J.B. Hunt Transport Services, Inc.JBHT8.80%
Expeditors International of Washington, Inc.EXPD8.98%
GXO Logistics, Inc.GXO3.49%
Kirby CorporationKEX2.63%
Matson, Inc.MATX1.66%
ArcBest CorporationARCB0.92%
The Greenbrier Companies, Inc.GBX0.77%

Backtested performance vs SPY

Performance is backtested from the returned tearsheet series. It reflects the model basket methodology and benchmark series, not live fund returns or a filed portfolio track record. Performance as of Nov 22, 2026.

Total Return

+26.7%

↑ SPY +3.2%

Ann. Return

+27.9%

↑ SPY +3.3%

Ann. Vol

22.8%

↑ SPY 14.5%

Sharpe

1.22

↑ SPY 0.23

Max Drawdown

-15.2%

↓ SPY -11.5%

Alpha vs SPY

+24.6%

↑ hit rate 51.7%

Performance as of Nov 22, 2026. Risk-free rate for Sharpe and Sortino: 0% (no risk-free rate applied).

Rolling Performance vs Benchmark

Portfolio Holdings

Holding
Weight
Country
Exchange
Sector
Industry
Mkt Cap
Price
1Y
1Y Trend
CSX
CSXCSX Corporation
20.0%
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
NSC
NSCNorfolk Southern Corporation
20.0%
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
ODFL
ODFLOld Dominion Freight Line, Inc.
16.0%
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
EXPD
EXPDExpeditors International of Washington, Inc.
9.0%
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
JBHT
JBHTJ.B. Hunt Transport Services, Inc.
8.8%
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
XPO
XPOXPO Logistics, Inc.
8.4%
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
CHRW
CHRWC.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc.
8.3%
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
GXO
GXOGXO Logistics, Inc.
3.5%
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
KEX
KEXKirby Corporation
2.6%
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
MATX
MATXMatson, Inc.
1.7%
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
ARCB
ARCBArcBest Corporation
0.9%
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
GBX
GBXThe Greenbrier Companies, Inc.
0.8%
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

SSR performance series fallback

The table below is the server-rendered reference series behind the interactive chart. Values show the wealth index level from a 1.00 starting value, not a second 1Y return figure. Series as of Nov 22, 2026.

DateModel basket wealth indexSPY
Nov 25, 20251.0000x1.0000x
Nov 26, 20251.0073x1.0069x
Nov 28, 20251.0096x1.0124x
Dec 1, 20251.0151x1.0078x
Dec 2, 20251.0173x1.0096x
Dec 3, 20251.0425x1.0131x
Dec 4, 20251.0481x1.0139x
Dec 5, 20251.0530x1.0158x
Dec 8, 20251.0434x1.0128x
Dec 9, 20251.0382x1.0119x
Dec 10, 20251.0717x1.0186x
Dec 11, 20251.0769x1.0210x
Dec 12, 20251.0764x1.0100x
Dec 15, 20251.0728x1.0085x
Dec 16, 20251.0666x1.0057x
Dec 17, 20251.0616x0.9946x
Dec 18, 20251.0667x1.0021x
Dec 19, 20251.0650x1.0083x
Dec 22, 20251.0695x1.0145x
Dec 23, 20251.0664x1.0192x
Dec 24, 20251.0705x1.0228x
Dec 26, 20251.0687x1.0227x
Dec 29, 20251.0667x1.0190x
Dec 30, 20251.0599x1.0178x
Dec 31, 20251.0509x1.0102x
Jan 2, 20261.0615x1.0121x
Jan 5, 20261.0769x1.0188x
Jan 6, 20261.0957x1.0249x
Jan 7, 20261.0754x1.0216x
Jan 8, 20261.0901x1.0215x
Jan 9, 20261.0952x1.0282x
Jan 12, 20261.0994x1.0298x
Jan 13, 20261.0991x1.0278x
Jan 14, 20261.1057x1.0227x
Jan 15, 20261.1230x1.0255x
Jan 16, 20261.1155x1.0247x
Jan 20, 20261.0901x1.0038x
Jan 21, 20261.1254x1.0154x
Jan 22, 20261.1208x1.0207x
Jan 23, 20261.1148x1.0211x
Jan 26, 20261.1205x1.0262x
Jan 27, 20261.1227x1.0303x
Jan 28, 20261.1191x1.0302x
Jan 30, 20261.1294x1.0251x
Feb 2, 20261.1671x1.0302x
Feb 3, 20261.1900x1.0215x
Feb 4, 20261.2321x1.0165x
Feb 5, 20261.2244x1.0039x
Feb 6, 20261.2464x1.0231x
Feb 9, 20261.2387x1.0280x
Feb 10, 20261.2399x1.0253x
Feb 11, 20261.2504x1.0251x
Feb 12, 20261.1929x1.0093x
Feb 13, 20261.2186x1.0100x
Feb 17, 20261.2271x1.0116x
Feb 18, 20261.2376x1.0167x
Feb 19, 20261.2401x1.0140x
Feb 20, 20261.2661x1.0213x
Feb 23, 20261.2318x1.0109x
Feb 24, 20261.2337x1.0183x
Feb 25, 20261.2209x1.0269x
Feb 26, 20261.2459x1.0212x
Feb 27, 20261.2575x1.0163x
Mar 2, 20261.2728x1.0168x
Mar 3, 20261.2726x1.0079x
Mar 4, 20261.2796x1.0150x
Mar 5, 20261.2446x1.0093x
Mar 6, 20261.1923x0.9961x
Mar 9, 20261.2036x1.0048x
Mar 10, 20261.1933x1.0032x
Mar 11, 20261.1788x1.0019x
Mar 12, 20261.1397x0.9867x
Mar 13, 20261.1413x0.9811x
Mar 16, 20261.1510x0.9911x
Mar 17, 20261.1600x0.9937x
Mar 18, 20261.1479x0.9799x
Mar 19, 20261.1404x0.9775x
Mar 20, 20261.1341x0.9608x
Mar 23, 20261.1463x0.9709x
Mar 24, 20261.1484x0.9676x
Mar 25, 20261.1628x0.9730x
Mar 26, 20261.1579x0.9557x
Mar 27, 20261.1498x0.9394x
Mar 30, 20261.1491x0.9362x
Mar 31, 20261.1810x0.9634x
Apr 1, 20261.1943x0.9707x
Apr 2, 20261.1950x0.9716x
Apr 6, 20261.2045x0.9762x
Apr 7, 20261.1977x0.9766x
Apr 8, 20261.2333x1.0015x
Apr 9, 20261.2365x1.0072x
Apr 10, 20261.2301x1.0066x
Apr 13, 20261.2336x1.0164x
Apr 14, 20261.2435x1.0288x
Apr 15, 20261.2285x1.0369x
Apr 16, 20261.2695x1.0395x
Apr 17, 20261.2837x1.0520x
Apr 20, 20261.3005x1.0499x
Apr 21, 20261.2969x1.0431x
Apr 22, 20261.2807x1.0536x
Apr 23, 20261.3281x1.0495x
Apr 24, 20261.3145x1.0577x
Apr 27, 20261.3192x1.0595x
Apr 28, 20261.3173x1.0543x
Apr 29, 20261.2923x1.0542x
Apr 30, 20261.3051x1.0646x
May 1, 20261.2884x1.0676x
May 4, 20261.2309x1.0637x
May 5, 20261.2640x1.0722x
May 6, 20261.2777x1.0871x
May 7, 20261.2649x1.0838x
May 8, 20261.2702x1.0927x
May 11, 20261.2600x1.0952x
May 12, 20261.2464x1.0936x
May 13, 20261.2431x1.0997x
May 14, 20261.2759x1.1084x
May 15, 20261.2821x1.0950x
May 18, 20261.2920x1.0943x
May 19, 20261.2892x1.0870x
May 20, 20261.3055x1.0981x
May 21, 20261.2930x1.1003x
May 22, 20261.2942x1.1046x
May 26, 20261.3247x1.1120x
May 27, 20261.3396x1.1118x
May 28, 20261.3168x1.1179x
May 29, 20261.3179x1.1207x
Jun 1, 20261.3332x1.1237x
Jun 2, 20261.3312x1.1253x
Jun 3, 20261.3419x1.1174x
Jun 4, 20261.3568x1.1216x
Jun 5, 20261.3640x1.0926x
Jun 8, 20261.3770x1.0951x
Jun 9, 20261.3894x1.0919x
Jun 10, 20261.3519x1.0747x
Jun 11, 20261.3877x1.0929x
Jun 12, 20261.3936x1.0989x
Jun 15, 20261.3694x1.1182x
Jun 16, 20261.3565x1.1116x
Jun 17, 20261.3068x1.0977x
Jun 18, 20261.3106x1.1062x
Jun 22, 20261.3224x1.1028x
Jun 23, 20261.3087x1.0868x
Jun 24, 20261.3076x1.0862x
Jun 25, 20261.3341x1.0878x
Jun 26, 20261.3334x1.0800x
Jun 29, 20261.3496x1.0977x
Jun 30, 20261.3446x1.1063x
Jul 1, 20261.3601x1.1048x
Jul 2, 20261.3639x1.1033x
Jul 6, 20261.3569x1.1130x
Jul 7, 20261.3530x1.1077x
Jul 8, 20261.3550x1.1043x
Jul 9, 20261.3836x1.1136x
Jul 10, 20261.3881x1.1184x
Jul 13, 20261.3998x1.1098x
Jul 14, 20261.4016x1.1138x
Jul 15, 20261.3919x1.1182x
Jul 16, 20261.4516x1.1121x
Jul 17, 20261.4457x1.1011x
Jul 20, 20261.4256x1.0994x
Jul 21, 20261.4333x1.1085x
Jul 22, 20261.4281x1.1072x
Jul 23, 20261.4531x1.0936x
Jul 24, 20261.4461x1.0947x
Jul 27, 20261.4077x1.0949x
Jul 28, 20261.3916x1.0975x
Jul 29, 20261.3772x1.0806x
Jul 30, 20261.3387x1.0988x
Jul 31, 20261.3436x1.1067x
Aug 3, 20261.3383x1.1224x
Aug 4, 20261.3802x1.1427x
Aug 5, 20261.3678x1.1404x
Aug 6, 20261.3493x1.1386x
Aug 7, 20261.3530x1.1455x
Aug 10, 20261.3442x1.1452x
Aug 11, 20261.3375x1.1415x
Aug 12, 20261.3595x1.1444x
Aug 13, 20261.3742x1.1524x
Aug 14, 20261.3647x1.1501x
Aug 17, 20261.3736x1.1447x
Aug 18, 20261.3538x1.1369x
Aug 19, 20261.3545x1.1393x
Aug 20, 20261.3550x1.1297x
Aug 21, 20261.3653x1.1344x
Aug 24, 20261.3524x1.1310x
Aug 25, 20261.3508x1.1346x
Aug 26, 20261.3635x1.1349x
Aug 27, 20261.3589x1.1423x
Aug 28, 20261.3526x1.1397x
Aug 31, 20261.3502x1.1363x
Sep 1, 20261.3034x1.1285x
Sep 2, 20261.3014x1.1335x
Sep 3, 20261.3050x1.1454x
Sep 4, 20261.3198x1.1410x
Sep 8, 20261.3136x1.1347x
Sep 9, 20261.2961x1.1294x
Sep 10, 20261.2982x1.1227x
Sep 11, 20261.2986x1.1322x
Sep 14, 20261.3069x1.1272x
Sep 15, 20261.3027x1.1220x
Sep 16, 20261.2633x1.1171x
Sep 17, 20261.2672x1.1297x
Sep 18, 20261.2544x1.1284x
Sep 21, 20261.2479x1.1459x
Sep 22, 20261.2543x1.1457x
Sep 23, 20261.2576x1.1375x
Sep 24, 20261.2407x1.1365x
Sep 25, 20261.2377x1.1427x
Sep 28, 20261.2458x1.1342x
Sep 29, 20261.2504x1.1321x
Sep 30, 20261.2327x1.1298x
Oct 1, 20261.2507x1.1318x
Oct 2, 20261.2795x1.1402x
Oct 5, 20261.2625x1.1479x
Oct 6, 20261.2536x1.1542x
Oct 7, 20261.2397x1.1514x
Oct 8, 20261.2636x1.1465x
Oct 9, 20261.2654x1.1534x
Oct 12, 20261.2656x1.1527x
Oct 13, 20261.2698x1.1526x
Oct 14, 20261.2814x1.1401x
Oct 15, 20261.2986x1.1434x
Oct 16, 20261.2896x1.1307x
Oct 19, 20261.2779x1.1357x
Oct 20, 20261.2879x1.1393x
Oct 21, 20261.2942x1.1453x
Oct 22, 20261.3211x1.1318x
Oct 23, 20261.2953x1.1258x
Oct 26, 20261.3001x1.1338x
Oct 27, 20261.3281x1.1402x
Oct 28, 20261.2889x1.1441x
Nov 5, 20261.2635x1.0859x
Nov 9, 20261.2713x1.1151x
Nov 10, 20261.2727x1.1110x
Nov 11, 20261.2919x1.1256x
Nov 12, 20261.2981x1.1216x
Nov 13, 20261.3005x1.1176x
Nov 16, 20261.3007x1.0962x
Nov 17, 20261.2780x1.0851x
Nov 18, 20261.2866x1.0817x
Nov 19, 20261.2682x1.0605x
Nov 20, 20261.2382x1.0219x

Themes and category

American RenaissanceIndustrial RenaissanceDefensive Income

Methodology and caveats

QuantLink fetches this idea from the live FastAPI ideas endpoints and renders the returned title, thesis, holdings, themes, benchmark, and tearsheet fields directly. Missing fields are left unavailable rather than fabricated.

Holdings are a curated model basket. They are not 13F filings, not insider filings, not adviser holdings, and not a claim that any person or fund owns the basket.

Backtested performance depends on the returned basket weights, benchmark, rebalancing assumptions, available price history, and calculation choices in the tearsheet endpoint. Backtests can differ materially from live results and do not include every cost, tax, capacity, liquidity, or execution constraint an investor may face.

Equal-weight and target-weight baskets can drift between rebalance points. Rebalancing can increase turnover, and concentrated thematic baskets can have higher drawdowns than a broad market benchmark.

Frequently asked questions

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